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This paper seeks to examine if the relative size of government (measured as the share of
total expenditure in GNP can be determined to Granger cause the rate of economic growth,
or if the rate of economic growth can be determined to Granger cause the relative size of
government. For this purpose, we first use a bivariate error correction model within a
Granger causality framework, as well as adding unemployment and inflation (separately)
as explanatory variables, creating a simple ‘trivariate’ analysis for each of these two variables.
The combined analysis of bivariate and trivariate tests offers a rich menu of possible causal
patterns. Using data on Greece, UK and Ireland, the analysis shows: i) government size
Granger causes economic growth in all countries of the sample in the short run and in the
long run for Ireland and the UK; ii) economic growth Granger causes increases in the
relative size of government in Greece, and, when inflation is included, in the UK.
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I. Introduction
The size of government expenditures and its effect on long-run economic
growth, and vice versa, has been an issue of sustained interest for decades.
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The received literature, essentially of an empirical nature, has proceeded at
two levels.
One set of studies has explored the principal causes of growth in the public
sector. Wagner’s Law -the “Law of increasing expansion of public and
particularly state activities” (Wagner, 1893)- is one of the earliest attempts
that emphasises economic growth as the fundamental determinant of public
sector growth. Empirical tests of this hypothesis, either in the form of standard
regression analysis (see, for instance, Ganti and Kolluri, 1979; and
Georgakopoulos and Loizides, 1994, to cite only a few) or in the form of
error-correction regression (see, for instance, Kolluri, Panik and Wanab, 2000,
and the literature cited therein), have yielded results that differ considerably
from country to country.
The other set of studies has been directed towards assessing the effects of
the general flow of government services on private decision making and,
more specifically, on the impact of government spending on long-run economic
growth. Macroeconomics, especially the Keynesian school of thought, suggests
that government spending accelerates economic growth. Thus, government
expenditure is regarded as an exogenous force that changes aggregate output.
Here, again, empirical work, either in standard regression forms (see, for
instance, Landau, 1983) or error-correction regressions (see, for instance,
Ghali, 1998, and the literature cited therein) finds diverse results.
Although each line of enquiry has thrown interesting light on the
phenomena, in neither case has the assumed causative process been subjected
to rigorous empirical pre-testing. Purely a priori judgements for choosing
between the two competing postulates are rendered difficult for at least three
reasons: Firstly, there is the possibility of feedback in macro relations, which
tend to obscure both the direction and the nature of causality. Secondly, as
demonstrated by Ahsan, Kwan and Sahni (1992), in the public expenditure-
national income nexus, failure to account for omitted variables can give rise
to misleading causal ordering among variables and, in general, yields biased
results. Thirdly, if co-integration among the variables of the system is admitted,
then the error-correction terms would provide an additional source of causality.
Indeed, a principal feature of cointegrated variables is that their time paths
are influenced by the extent of any deviation from long-run equilibrium. Thus,
omission of the error correction terms would entail a mispecification error127 GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
and potentially bias the results. In the context of trivariate systems such an
outcome is very possible because the introduction of a third variable in the
system can alter the causal inference based on the simple bivariate system.
Singh and Sahni (1984) initially examined the causal link between
government expenditure and national income. Subsequently, their work has
generated many other studies, the results of which range the full continuum
from no causality to bi-directional causality between these two variables. Ram
(1986, 1987), among the existing causality studies, suggested that differences
in the nature of underlying data, the test procedure and the period studied
may explain the diversity in results. A few years later, Ahsan, Kwan and
Sahni (1992) added various other factors that may explain the inconsistency
amongst the results obtained by different authors, one of which is the influence
of ‘omitted’ variables. It is suggested that failure to account for omitted
variables can give rise to a misleading causal ordering among the variables.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the only one that examines the
causal link between public sector size and GNP within a trivariate framework.
Recently, various other studies have used the cointegration test results, but in
the context of a bivariate approach, to either validate or invalidate Wagner’s
Law (see, for instance, Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou,1995; Bohl, 1996;
Chletsos and Kollias, 1997; Kolluri et al., 2000, and the literature cited therein).
The only study that follows a methodology similar to ours is Ghali (1998).
That study uses multivariate cointegration techniques but puts the emphasis
on a different place.
A significant weakness of many of the previous studies on this topic (save
for Ghali’s, 1998 study) was the failure to adjust for the co-integration result
of the time series in the case of the trivatiate framework, that renders traditional
statistical inference invalid. Indeed, as we will discuss below, the introduction
of a third variable in the system can alter not only the causal inference based
on the simple bivariate system, but also the magnitude of the estimates.
The principal aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate the causal link
between the size of the public sector and real per capita income within the
bivariate and trivariate frameworks, by resorting to recent developments in
the theory of cointegrated processes. The combined analysis of bivariate and
trivariate tests offers a rich menu of possible causal patterns. To this end, we
employ cointegration analysis, error-correction modelling and multivariate128 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
causality tests. We conducted three different specifications: i) in the first, we
test for a causal link between the size of the public sector, as measured by the
ratio of government expenditure relative to GNP (hereafter denoted as Gt),
and real per capita income (hereafter denoted as Yt) at the bivariate level; ii)
in the second we include Gt, Yt and the unemployment rates; and iii) in the
third we substitute the unemployment rates by the inflation rates. The last
two specifications are intended to investigate whether, by switching to a
trivariate system from the bivariate one, the causality results would leave
unchanged the causal link between Gt and Yt in every case examined. Should
Granger causality of a certain pattern be robust to the specification changes
from bivariate to trivariate system, one would have more confidence in the
predictive power of the underlying causal process. Besides, since trivariate
tests incorporate more information than bivariate ones, the causal inferences
drawn appear more reliable.
A question that naturally arises is how do we determine which variable
has to be included in the specification of the system. This is difficult to answer,
given that the studies in these areas are empirical in orientation. In principle,
any variable that is intimately connected with the size of public sector as well
as national income could be used. In this paper, we decided to use
unemployment and inflation rates for two reasons. First, during the period
examined these variables were at the centre of interest of economic policies.
Indeed, compared with the relatively placid and successful decades of the
1950s and 1960s in most European countries, the 1970s and afterwards was
accompanied not only by rising unemployment on a scale not previously
experienced since the inter-war years, but also by very strong inflationary
pressures. We therefore expect inflation and unemployment to play an
important role in the formation of the causal process between G and Y.
Secondly, various empirical studies find that both unemployment and inflation
are intimately connected with the size of public sector growth and national
income. For example, Abrams (1999) presents evidence that the rise in US
government outlays (as a percent of GDP since 1949) is responsible for
increases in the unemployment rate, which have contributed to slow down
the growth of the US economy. On the other hand, a number of authors, such
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(1997), estimate time-series regressions of growth and inflation across
countries and find inflation to be inversely related to growth.
We applied trivariate causality tests using time series data drawn from
three European countries over the period from early 1950s to mid-1990s.
One developed country, the United Kingdom, and two developing countries;
namely, Ireland and Greece were selected for investigation. Since empirical
work on this topic covers both developed and developing nations, it is of
interest to test whether similar or different results hold between these two
categories of countries.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section II we briefly outline
the data set and provide some stylised facts of the main characteristics of the
variables that we used in the analysis. Section III considers some theoretical
issues as well as some empirical results of past studies. In section IV we
present the econometric methodology. Section V provides the empirical results
of our study, while section VI concludes.
II. Data and some Stylized Facts
The data set used in this study relates to the UK, Greece and Ireland and
consists of annual observations. Income, Yt, is measured as real per capita
Gross National Product (GNP) at market prices in year t. Real government
expenditure is measured as the Public Authorities spending on goods and
services (excluding transfer payments), i.e. consumption and gross fixed capital
formation. Public sector size Gt, is measured as the ratio of real government
expenditure to GNP. Unemployment rate UNt, is calculated as the unemployed
persons divided by the working population. Pt, is the wholesale price index
and its change, Dln Pt, gives the inflation rate  . t P & For the UK and Ireland, data
for Yt, Gt, and Pt, come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics,
while data for UNt, are taken from the European Economy published by the
European Commission. The statistical data for Greece come from the National
Accounts and the Labour Force Organization and cover the time period 1948-
1995. For the UK and Ireland, the annual time series runs from 1950 through
1995. Note, however, that in UK and Ireland, data for the UNt series cover the
period 1960 to 1995, since data are not available before 1960. All variables130 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
are expressed in natural logarithms; hence their first differences approximate
the growth rates.
In the choice of government size we follow the procedure adopted by
practically all scholars to date and relate government spending to GNP.
Practices, however, are more varied as to which types of public expenditures
one should relate to GNP and whether one should use deflated or undeflated
data. Researchers have also used differing approaches regarding the inclusion
of transfer payments in the size of the public sector. For example, Ram (1986)
argued that transfer payments should be excluded to make government
spending compatible with Wagner’s ideas. Musgrave and Musgrave (1980)
also excluded transfer payments from government expenditure for the reason
that their inclusion overstates the size of government. Recent works by Ahsan,
Kwan and Sahni (1996) and Ghali (1998), utilise an aggregate measure of Gt
inclusive of transfer payments in their analysis. However, since the intention
of this paper is to investigate the causal chain between the size of public
sector and economic growth, transfer payments were excluded, in order to be
able to differentiate the effects of income redistribution and provision of public
services on growth.
Opinions differ concerning the choice of whether one should use deflated
or undeflated measures of government size.1As it is possible to find viable
arguments both in favour and against the use of deflated ratios, we have decided
to use deflated measures of government size in this paper.
Before proceeding to the estimation of the causal link between Gt and Yt,
it is of interest to have a bird’s eye view of the basic characteristics of the
variables used in this study.2 The evolution of Gt, Yt and growth rates of GNP,
together with unemployment and inflation rates, during the period 1960-1995
reveals some interesting findings. First, government spending in Greece during
the 1960s was around 19.0 per cent of  GNP, some 3 percentage points lower
than in the UK and 1 percentage point lower than in Ireland. During the 25
years since then, the rise in spending in Greece has been more than in Ireland
and in the UK, with the result that now spending is highest there. It was only
after the Maastricht Treaty (1992) that public spending control in Greece
1 See, for instance, Cullis and Jones (1987).
2 To conserve space, this set of data is omitted but it is available upon request.131 GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
became an important objective of economic policy with the aim of gaining
admission to the European Monetary Union.
Second, in terms of the level of economic development, the UK is by far
the more developed country. Throughout most of the period, and especially
during the 1960s, real per capita income in the UK was nearly twice the
levels of Ireland and Greece. However, these differences have changed
substantially over time. On average, real per capita incomes in Greece and
Ireland rose around 1 per cent a year during the period, whereas in the UK
there was an absolute contraction at the rate of 0.5 per cent per annum. Real
per capita incomes in Greece, which had been previously rising, were reversed
after the early 1980s, and between 1986 and 1990 fell on average by about 12
per cent. On the contrary, in Ireland real per capita income increased by 6 per
cent during the same period. By the mid 1990s, real per capita income levels
in Ireland were about 30 per cent higher than those in Greece, and only 10 per
cent lower than those of the UK.
Third, relating growth rates of public spending to the growth rates of GNP
among these countries, two general remarks are in order. First, growth rates
of GNP declined everywhere from the rates prevailing in the 1960s, but in
Greece this reduction was much greater. Second, and less obvious, during the
period growth rates of government expenditures in the UK and Ireland declined
in much the same way as the growth rates of GNP, whereas in Greece
government spending grew at a faster rate than GNP (some 3 percentage
points). Even in this very rudimentary way, we observe a long-run constraining
relationship between the growth of GNP and the growth of expenditure in the
UK and Ireland. Thus, the fact to be explained in these two countries is not
the high variability of government expenditure but rather its remarkable
stability with respect to the trend growth of national income.
Finally, for much of the 1970s and early 1980s inflation was one of the
overriding issues in all three countries, often running into double figures. All
three economies displayed significant deterioration in inflation performance
after 1974. However, whereas Irish and British inflation fell significantly after
1985, inflation in Greece persisted. Nevertheless, one problem that refused
to go away was unemployment. In fact, until the middle of the 1990s
unemployment was on an upward trend, rising into double figures in Ireland
and close to 10 percent in the UK and Greece.132 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
III. Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence
The substantial growth of the size of government expenditures in both the
developed and developing nations since World War II, and its effect(s) on
long-run economic growth (or vice versa), has spawned a vast literature that
offers diverse attempts to explain the observed phenomenon.
On the one hand, public finance studies have been directed towards
identifying the principal causes of public sector growth.3 Wagner’s Law of
public expenditure is one of the earliest attempts that emphasize economic
growth as the fundamental determinant of public sector growth. The literature
on this topic is immense to say the least. Some studies find a significant
positive relationship between public sector growth and economic growth only
for developing nations but not for developed countries. Others even report a
negative relationship between government spending and GNP.
On the other hand, macroeconomics, especially the Keynesian school of
thought puts the emphasis on a different place. The analysis bears upon the
question of the role of government in economic growth. A considerable amount
of attention has been directed towards assessing the effect of the general flow
of government services on economic growth.4
During the last twenty years or so, studying the underlying causal process
3 Henrekson and Lybeck (1988) provide an excellent survey of various hypotheses
concerning the sources of growth of government expenditures.
4 Several studies have examined the relationship between the growth rate of real per capita
output and the share of government spending and find diverse results. For example, Landau
(1983), in a cross-section study of over 100 countries in the period 1961-76, reported
evidence of a negative relationship between the growth rate of real per capita GDP and the
share of government consumption expenditure in GDP. By contrast, Ram (1986), utilising
a two-sector model, in a cross-section study of 115 countries and in the two-decade period
from 1960 through 1980, found that growth of government size has a positive effect on
economic growth. Barro (1991) reports mixed results. In his cross-section study of 98
nations between the years 1960 and 1985, he found that increases in government consumption
expenditure measured as a percent of national income reduce per capita growth. However,
when the share of public investment was considered, Barro found a positive but statistically
insignificant relationship between public investment and the output growth rate. Finally, in
the United States, Razzolini and Shughart (1997) present evidence that growth in the relative
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between government spending and GDP, or their close variants, has made
parallel efforts. The principle reason that led researchers to this field of analysis
was the difficulty of a possible feedback in macro relations, which tend to
obscure both the direction and the nature of causality.
It is clear that knowledge of the true nature of the causative process between
government spending and GDP will help determine the robustness of the
estimated relationship. Should the causality be Wagnerian, the estimates
derived from macro-econometric models would evidently suffer from
simultaneity bias. On the other hand, if the causality were Keynesian, the
estimates reported in public finance studies would similarly be biased.
Nevertheless, knowledge of the precise causative process has important policy
implications. For example, if the causality were Wagnerian, public expenditure
is relegated to a passive role, if Keynesian, it acquires the status of an important
policy variable.
Singh and Sahni (1984), using the Granger-Sims methodology, initially
examined the causal link between government expenditure and national
income in a bivariate framework. Their empirical results, based on data for
India, suggest that the causal process between public expenditure and national
income is neither Wagnerian nor Keynesian. Similarly, Ahsan, Kwan, and
Sahni (1992) have used the same approach, but in a trivariate framework.
Their interesting results indicate that while the US data fail to detect any
causality between public expenditure and national income at the bivariate
level, there was strong evidence of indirect causality from GDP to public
spending via both money stock and budgetary deficits. Bohl (1996) applied
tests of integration, cointegration and Granger causality in a bivaritate context,
and found support to Wagner’s law for only the United Kingdom and Canada,
out of the G7 countries,5 during the post-World War II period. Hondroyiannis
and Papapetrou (1995), and Chletsos and Kollias (1997), applied the same
methodology in Greece, and found mixed results. To our knowledge, Ghali’s
(1998) study is the only one that uses multivariate cointegration techniques,
and examines the dynamic interactions between government size and economic
growth in a five-variable system, consisting of the growth rates of GDP, total
5 These countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
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government spending, investment, exports, and imports. Using data from ten
OECD countries, Ghali’s study shows that government size Granger-causes
growth in all countries of the sample. More recently, Kolluri, et. al. (2000),
using a bivariate framework, estimated the long-run relationship between gross
domestic product and government spending in the G7 countries for the period
1960-1993. Most of their empirical findings confirm Wagner’s Law for the
G7 countries; that is, government spending tends to be income elastic in the
long run. This disparate evidence calls for a re-examination of the differences
in the causality results.
 As we mentioned in the introduction, the focus of this paper is to
empirically evaluate the causal link between Gt and Yt within the bivariate
and trivariate frameworks, by resorting to recent developments in the theory
of cointegrated process. Models that use only levels of variables or first
differences (see for instance Singh and Sahni, 1984, and Ahsan et al., 1992),
are mispecified because they ignore interim short-run corrections to long-run
equilibrium. Besides, in the case of the trivariate approach this problem, as
we will show below, is even stronger because the third variable can alter the
causal inference based on the simple bivariate system.
IV. Econometric Methodology
 The notion that there is a long-run tendency for the public sector to grow
relative to national income or vice-versa has been an issue in economics that
is rarely questioned. Thus, if the variables Yt and Gt are considered as stochastic
trends and if they follow a common long-run equilibrium relationship, then
these variables should be cointegrated. According to Engle and Granger
(1987), cointegrated variables must have an ECM representation. The main
reason for the popularity of cointegration analysis is that it provides a formal
background for testing and estimating short-run and long run relationships
among economic variables. Furthermore, the ECM strategy provides an answer
to the problem of spurious correlation.6
If Yt and Gt are cointegrated, an ECM representation could have the
following form:
6 For a useful discussion of spurious correlations and ECM strategy, see Enders (1998).135 GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
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where L and D are the lag and difference operators, respectively, and Et-1, Ct-1
are error-correction terms. The error correction term Et-1 in (1) is the lagged
value of the residuals from the OLS regression of Yt  on Gt and the term Ct-1 in
(2) corresponds to the lagged value of the residuals from the OLS regression
of Gt  on Yt. In (1) and (2), DYt, DGt, ut and et are stationary, implying that their
right-hand side must also be stationary. It is obvious that (1) and (2) compose
a bi-variate VAR in first differences augmented by the error-correction terms
Et-1 and Ct-1, indicating that ECM model and cointegration are equivalent
representations.
According to Granger (1969; 1988), in a cointegrated system of two series
expressed by ECM representation causality must run in at least one way. Within
the ECM formulation of (1) and (2), Gt  does not Granger cause Yt if all a3i = 0
and a1 = 0. Equivalently, Yt does not Granger cause Gt if all b2i = 0 and b1 = 0.
However, it is possible that the causal link between Yt and Gt estimated from
the ECM formulation (1) and (2) could have been caused by a third variable.
Such a possibility may be explored within a multivariate framework including
other important variables, such as the unemployment rates UNt or inflation rates
, t P &  which represent considerable determinants of real GNP and government
expenditures. Thus, the causal relationship between Yt and Gt can be examined
within the following ECM representation:
where Zt could be the macroeconomic state of the economy. Regarding
(1)
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unemployment rates UNt, or inflation rates,  t P &  as ‘third’ variables, the system
captures the response of Yt  and Gt  to changes in UNt, or  . t P & The difference
between the ECM models (1) and (2), and (3) and (4) is that the introduction
of UNt, and  t P &  could alter the causal inference based on the simple bivariate
system. This occurs in one of three ways. First, the coefficients a2i and a3i (b2i
and b3i) need not be similar to a2i and a3i (b2i and  b3i), respectively, either in
direction or in magnitude. Second, Yt and Gt can be related through UNt or
t P & even though the parameters a3i  and b2i are statistically insignificant. In
other words, any spurious causality that arises in the bivariate system may be
removed due to the presence of UNt or  . t P & Finally, we may also find direct
causality between Gt and Yt in a trivariate context, which may or may not be
detected, in a bivariate framework. In this latter scenario, the third variable
itself explains the causation. Thus, causality tests reported in earlier studies
(see, for instance, Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou,1995; Bohl, 1996; Chletsos
and Kollias, 1997; and Kolluri et al., 2000) might simply be artefacts of
mispecified models.
V.  Empirical Results
To test formally for the presence of a unit root for each variable in the
model, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests of
the type given by regression (5) and (6) were conducted. The ADF test is
conducted using the regression of the form:
where DWt  are the first differences of the series W, k is the lag order and t
stands for time. Equation (5) is with constant and time trend.
PP tests involve computing the following OLS regression:
where a0, a1, a2 are the conventional least-squares regression coefficients. The
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Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) is used to determine the lag order
of each variable under study. Mackinnon’s (1991) tables provide the cumulative
distribution of the ADF and PP test statistics. Tests for stationarity indicate
that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for the levels of the
variables. Using differenced data, the computed ADF and PP tests suggested
that the null hypothesis is rejected for the individual series, at the one or five
percent significance level, and the variables Yt, Gt, UNt, and  t P & are integrated
of order one, I(1).
Having determined that the variables are stationary in first differences,
we perform the Johansen cointegration test (1991) to examine whether the
variables in question have common trends. The Johansen procedure sets up a
VAR model with Gaussian errors, which can be defined by the following
Error-Correction representation,
where D is the difference operator, Xt is a p x 1 vector of non-stationary
variables (in levels), mt is the deterministic element of the VAR model and ut
is the vector of random errors which is distributed with mean zero and variance
matrix  [] (0, ) . t uN L- L  The Johansen technique determines whether the
coefficient matrix P contains information about the long-run properties of
the VAR model (7). The null hypothesis of cointegration to be tested is,
with apxr, bpxr full rank matrices. The null hypothesis (8) implies that in a VAR
model of type (7) there can be r-cointegrating relations among the variables
Xt. In this way, model (7) is denoted by H1, a is named the matrix of error-
correction parameters, and b is called the matrix of cointegrating vectors,
with the property that b¢ Xt is stationary [ b¢ Xt – l(0)]  even though Xt  is non-
stationary [ Xt – l(1)]  .
As we mentioned above, in the case of the UK and Ireland the system
[ Yt, Gt,  t P & ] is tested for cointegration over the period 1950-1995, while the
system [ Yt, Gt, UNt] is tested for the period 1960-1995, given that data for
unemployment series are not available before 1960. Cointegration tests cover
11 2 2 1 1 ... , ttt k t k k t k t t XXX X X u m DG D G G D P - - - - + - = + + + + + +
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the period 1948-1995 for Greece. In determining the number of cointegrating
vectors r, we use the maximum eigenvalue statistics, lmax. The null hypothesis
to be tested is that there can be r cointegrating vectors among the three-
variable systems [ Yt, Gt, UNt] and [ Yt, Gt,  t P & ]. In order to check the robustness
of the results to the order of the VAR, we carry out the Johansen cointegration
tests using one and two year lag lengths. As to the cointegration test results,
the lmax rank tests indicate that each group of the series is cointegrated. The
LR-tests are statistically significant, at the one and five percent levels, thus
rejecting the null hypothesis of noncointegration.7
Having verified that each group of the series Yt, Gt, and  , t P & Yt, Gt and UNt,
is cointegrated, we next investigate the causal pattern between Yt and Gt,
within the ECM models. In Table 1 we employ Hendry’s general-to-specific
strategy to estimate the bivariate ECM model (1) and (2), whereas Tables 2
and 3 present the same methodology in the case of trivariate ECM models of
the form (3) and (4). Five lags are used for each independent variable. The
lag length is reduced to five years to conserve degrees of freedom. The error-
correction terms Et-1 and Ct-1 serve as measures of disequilibrium, representing
stochastic shocks in the dependent variables, Yt and Gt, respectively. They
represent the proportion by which the long-run disequilibrium in the dependent
variables is corrected in each short-term period. The coefficients on Et-1 and
Ct-1 are expected to be negative and statistically significant. The coefficients
on the lagged values of DYt, DGt, DUNt and Dln Pt are short-run parameters
measuring the immediate impact of independent variables on DYt and DGt.
The rationale of Hendry’s general-to-specific approach is to re-estimate the
basic model by dropping the lagged variables with insignificant parameters
from the system. In the restricted model we include lagged values of
independent variables significant at the 10 percent level. The restricted
equations are nested within the unrestricted models.8 In this sense, when
equations are special cases of a general model, they appear to be nested within
the general model.
The various specification and diagnostic tests applied in the restricted
7 Detailed regression results are available from the authors and will be supplied on request.
8 In order to conserve space, we present only the results of the restricted models. Unrestricted
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equations DYt and DGt appear significant and robust, indicating that the
estimated ECM models fit the data adequately.  Choosing 1975 as the sample
breaking values of the parameter yield a stable solution, which is not sensitive
to changes in the sample range.9 The RESET (Regression Specification Test)
statistics reveal no serious omission of variables, indicating the correct
specification of the model. The ARCH (AutoRegressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity tests suggest that the errors are homoskedastic and
independent of the regressors. The BG (Breusch-Godfrey) tests reveal no
significant serial correlation in the disturbances of the error term. The JB
(Jarque-Bera) statistics suggest that the disturbances of the regressors are
normally distributed. In sum, specification and diagnostic testing ensure that
the general model is congruent and that the congruency is maintained through
the restricted equations.
Table 1 presents the ECM results within the bivariate system for Greece,
UK and Ireland.10 Several conclusions are apparent. The essential result in
Greece is that economic growth Granger causes public spending expansion
but not the other way round. Thus, there is a high degree of support for this
Wagner type phenomenon in the data for Greece; public spending tends to be
income elastic in the long run.11 Note, however, that real per capita income
growth never enters significant in the restricted equation. This fact is an
indication that expenditure plans are too “sticky” to change in the light of
short-term fluctuations in income. Nevertheless, the Keynesian view about
the causal effects of public expenditures on economic growth has become
apparent in the short run.
9 Note that in all three countries, varying the sample breaking date, the Chow F-statistics
show the stability of the ECM models over the chosen sub-periods.
10 To avoid overburdening the analysis with symbols, in this part, the time subscript is
omitted from all variables.
11 Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1995) cast doubt on the validity of Wagner’s hypothesis
in Greece, whereas Chletsos and Kollias (1997) found mixed results. Note, however, that
the findings of these studies are not directly related to our results, merely because they
defined government size as the ratio of total spending (including transfer payments) to
GNP. Even in that case, their results may be artefacts of mispecified models. This may
happen because they use standard Granger causality tests, in a bivariate context, without































Table 1.  Bivariate Estimates of Restricted ECMs
Greece                                      United Kingdom Ireland
DYt DGt DYt DGt DYt DGt
Constant 0.01 (1.31) --- --- --- 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (-0.42)
DYt (-1) 0.33 (2.35)* --- 0.40 (2.56) --- 0.25 (1.58)  ---
DYt (-2) --- --- 0.38 (2.59)* ---  --- ---
DYt (-3) 0.34 (2.41)* --- --- --- 0.30 (2.01)* ---
DYt (-5) --- --- --- --- 0.30 (2.08)* ---
DGt (-1) 0.16 (2.28)* -0.14 (-1.04) -0.15 (-1.18) 0.94 (4.207)* --- 0.72 (4.70)*
DGt (-2) --- --- 0.26 (2.68)* -0.61 (-4.135)* --- -0.56 (-3.39)*
DGt (-4) --- --- --- --- 0.23 (3.09)* ---
Et-1 -0.02 (-1.16) --- -0.46 (-3.39)* --- -0.99 (-5.18)* ---
Ct-1 --- -0.30 (-3.17)* --- -0.47 (-1.69) --- 0.01 (1.24)
2 R 0.30 0.21 0.23 0.41 0.54 0.40
DW 2.05 --- --- --- 1.86 2.04
SER 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 1.95 0.04
Chow (1975) 1.43 0.26 1.09 0.25 0.76 1.31














































RESET (1) 0.00 0.14 1.61 1.93 0.91 0.24
ARCH (2) 0.20 0.01 2.50 0.79 1.20 0.14
ARCH (3) 0.28 0.01 2.02 0.75 0.79 0.15
BG(2) 0.09 0.40 0.35 0.78 0.74 0.05
BG(3) 0.07 0.26 0.27 0.54 0.50 0.27
Notes: * is significant at the 5% level. Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. The error-correction term Et-1 (lagged one period) is the residual series
from the regression of Yt on Gt. Likewise, Ct-1 (lagged one period) is the residual from the corresponding regression of Gt on Yt. 
2 R is the adjusted
R2. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. SER is the standard error of the regression. Chow is the F-statistic for structural change in 1975. JB is the
Jarque-Bera test for the normality of the regression residuals. RESET is the Ramsey F-statistic for omitted variables. BG is the Breusch-Godfrey
F-statistic. ARCH is the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity F-statistic. In RESET, BG and ARCH tests, numbers in parentheses are the
lag lengths.
Table 1.  (Continued) Bivariate Estimates of Restricted ECMs
Greece                                      United Kingdom Ireland
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By contrast, for Ireland and the UK, our estimates show one-way causality
running from G to Y. These results are consistent with the Keynesian notion
suggesting that the causal linkage flows from DG to DY both in the long run
and the short-run. The fact that public spending in these two countries is
income inelastic in the long run simply indicates some long-run proportionality
between the size of public sector growth and GNP. This of course was only to
be expected given that, as we mentioned in section II, in these countries
government size kept pace with national income and, indeed, during the 1980s
income has grown just a little faster than public sector size. The behaviour of
the institutions that determine public expenditure, perhaps, explains its stability.
Indeed, at least in the UK, the institutional procedures adopted for
expenditure planning deliberately target expenditure growth on the expected
growth of national income. For instance, following the 1961 Plowden Report,
expenditure planning in Britain was institutionalised in the Public Expenditure
Survey Committee system. The intention of this system was to plan public
expenditure over a five-year horizon in relation to prospective resources. Real
public expenditure was projected as a stable share of the anticipated future
level of real income. On the contrary, the whole process of budgeting in Greece
-one year non-zero budgeting- has incentives to facilitate and maintain
bureaucratic growth and to supply a level of expenditures higher than that
which would result from simple majority rule.
Note that the sign of coefficient estimate Ct-1, in the regression DG for
Greece, is negative and statistically significant, which supports convergence
of the size of public sector growth to its conditional mean, determined by
GNP growth. That is, the sign is in accord with convergence toward the long-
run equilibrium and the results support Wagner’s Law for Greece. It indicates
that about one third (30 percent) of any disequilibrium between actual and
equilibrium public sector size, in any period, is made up during the current
period. Thus, the size of public sector growth in Greece responds mainly to
the trend level of real per capita income, rather than to its short-term variations.
This sort of sluggish adjustment process is, as we noted above, an indication
that expenditure plans are too rigid to change in line with short-term
fluctuations in income.
Similarly, the coefficients Et-1 in the regression DY for the UK and Ireland
are statistically significant and they support convergence of real per capita143 GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
income growth to its conditional mean determined, in part, by government
spending growth. It is hardly surprising, however, that in the UK the long run
growth effect of public sector size on economic growth is quite sluggish as
compared to that of Ireland. Indeed, in the UK, the response of real per capita
income growth to its previous period disequilibrium is only half of that in
Ireland. This is probably due, as we mentioned above, to inherent infrastructure
rigidities, institutional procedure for bargaining and planning, or perhaps
financial constraints, leading to delay in the implementation of public sector
projects. By contrast, in Ireland, sustained economic growth has had the
inevitable effect of stimulating demand for improved administration services,
increased developmental activities, and provision of better activity.
Table 2 presents the ECM results of unemployment within the tri-variate
system for Greece, UK and Ireland. Comparing the results in Tables 1 and 2
we can easily note some remarkable similarities and differences among the
three countries. First, all three experienced a growth slowdown because of
the unemployment. Nevertheless, the long-run causal effects continued to
hold in all three economies. Specifically, in Greece, Hendry’s general-to-
specific restrictions estimates indicate, again, an obvious one-way causality
running from DY to DG in the long run and unidirectional causality from DY
to DG in the short run, indicating that government spending contributed
cyclically to the economic growth of the economy. This finding can, also, be
interpreted as evidence that Greek governments adapted the actual level of
expenditures to the desired level partially to avoid jeopardising the goal of
economic stability. Indeed, the short-run dynamics of unemployment supports
the contention that public spending in Greece responded to the unemployment
target.
Second, the results for the UK and Ireland show, like the bivariate ones,
that public sector size Granger causes output growth in the long and the short
run. Nevertheless, in Ireland, when unemployment is introduced into the
system, the positive short-run influence of expansive demand policies, whose
most immediate impact on output growth might be expansionary, after
unemployment sets in the consequences are negative. This counter-cyclical
effect between growth and government spending simply means that, during
the period examined, aggregate supply shocks (e.g. increases in oil prices)































Table 2. Trivariate Estimates of Restricted ECMs: The Case of Unemployment
                              Greece                                 United Kingdom                               Ireland
DYt DGt DYt DGt DYt DGt
Constant --- --- --- --- 0.06 (0.18) 0.00 (0.32)
DYt (-1) --- --- 0.97 (6.76)* --- --- ---
DYt (-2) --- --- --- --- --- 0.00 (1.41)
DYt (-3) 0.70 (7.32)* --- --- --- --- ---
DYt (-4) --- --- --- 0.17 (1.32) --- ---
DYt (-5) --- --- --- --- 0.29 (2.07)* ---
DGt (-1) 0.23 (3.24)* --- --- 0.58 (5.19)* -0.25 (-3.36)* 0.74 (4.05)*
DGt (-2) --- --- --- --- --- -0.63 (-3.25)*
DGt (-3) --- --- --- 0.38 (2.24)* --- ---
DGt (-4) --- --- --- --- 0.13 (1.84) ---
DGt (-5) --- --- 0.06 (1.94)* --- --- ---
DUNt (-1) -0.09 (-2.62)* --- 0.59 (4.15)* -0.08 (-3.91)* -0.80 (-2.18)* 0.11 (1.54)
DUNt (-2) --- --- -0.39 (-2.36)* --- --- -0.11 (-1.62)
DUNt (-3) 0.11 (3.18)* --- -0.29 (-1.90) --- --- ---
DUNt (-4) --- --- -0.35 (-2.75)* 0.04 (1.73) --- ---














































Ct-1 --- -0.41 (-4.01)* --- -0.15 (-1.65) --- 0.03 (1.12)
2 R 0.34 0.26 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.44
DW --- --- 1.84 --- 1.90 2.02
SER 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.96 0.04
Chow (1975) 0.53 0.23 0.31 0.64 1.43 0.89
JB 1.07 0.38 0.54 1.20 0.31 0.50
RESET(1) 0.75 0.22 0.94 0.80 0.10 0.01
ARCH(2) 1.51 0.03 1.38 0.50 0.18 0.50
ARCH(3) 1.19 0.13 1.00 0.73 0.13 0.67
BG(2) 0.28 0.87 0.24 0.08 0.55 0.13
BG(3) 0.19 0.63 0.27 0.13 0.78 0.14
Notes: * is significant at the 5% level. Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. The error-correction term Et-1 (lagged one period) is the residual series
from the regression of Yt on Gt and UNt, and (lagged one period) is the residual from the corresponding regression of  Gt on Yt  and UNt. For the
remaining test statistics, see Table 1.
Table 2. (Continued) Trivariate Estimates of Restricted ECMs: The Case of Unemployment
                              Greece                                 United Kingdom                               Ireland
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aggregate demand shocks (e.g. fiscal policies) that move output and
employment in the same direction. Indeed, the public sector regression in
Ireland shows that the short-run dynamics of unemployment do not support
the view that the size of the public sector responded to unemployment levels
through public spending on goods and services.12
Third, the sign of the unemployment coefficient in the public sector
regression for the UK is the opposite of that indicated by stabilization policy.
Expenditures should be increased, not cut, when unemployment is high. This
counter-cyclical fiscal policy response to unemployment in the UK may, in
part, well reflect the fiscal restraint adopted by the British authorities during
the 1970s and 1980s. Given the overriding problems of inflation and budgetary
deficits, during the aforementioned periods, authorities were forced to adopt
an uneasy compromise mix of policies in an attempt to gain some trade off
between inflation, employment and growth. The problem with this line of
policy, however, was that it failed to eradicate inflation and left a residue of
unemployment and slow growth (see Aldcroft, 2001).
Finally, Table 3 gives estimation results for inflation as a third variable in
the system for all countries in the sample. Comparing these results with those
of the bivariate systems (Table 1) we observe three remarkable points that are
worth mentioning. First, perhaps the more salient aspect of our findings is
that, while in the UK our tests reveal no causal link between economic growth
and public spending at the bivariate level, in the case of trivariate system with
inflation as third variable, we do discern a causal chain. That is, inflation
explains the causation. This finding validates Wagner’s Law, because real
output seems to be an important determinant of long and short-run government
size growth.  An important implication of the reported reciprocity is that the
estimates of the coefficients of national income used in public finance studies
and those of the public expenditure reported in macro-econometric models
would be asymptotically biased as well as inconsistent. Second, the results
for Greece and Ireland support, like the bivariate ones, unidirectional causality
12 It is interesting to note, however, that when we include transfer payments to total
government expenditures, public sector size in Ireland Granger causes economic growth
procyclically. Presumably, such a finding is the result of income redistribution and not that













































Table 3. Trivariate Estimates of Restricted ECMs: The  Case of Inflation
                                 Greece                                           United Kingdom                                Ireland
DYt DGt DYt DGt DYt DGt
Constant 0.10 (8.15)* -0.02 (-1.51) --- -0.02 (1.84) 0.07 (0.21) -0.00 (-0.06)
DYt (-1) -0.33 (-2.37)* --- 0.44 (3.33)* 0.46 (2.09)* --- ---
DGt (-1) --- 0.33 (2.20)* -0.13 (-1.44) 0.76 (4.2)* --- 0.64 (3.98)*
DGt (-2) --- 0.35 (2.94)* --- --- --- -0.64 (-4.13)*
DGt (-4) --- --- --- --- 0.28 (3.40)* ---
DlnPt (-1) -0.47 (-6.69)* 0.66 (3.09)* 0.15 (3.05)* 0.41 (3.18)* --- 0.01 (2.10)*
DlnPt (-2) --- -0.48 (-2.13)* --- -0.48 (-3.15)* -0.20 (-1.66) ---
DlnPt (-3) --- --- --- 0.25 (1.82) -0.27 (-1.86) 0.01 (2.44)*
DlnPt (-5) --- --- --- --- --- 0.01 (3.20)*
Et-1  0.01 (1.04) --- -0.55 (-4.00)* --- -0.97 (-5.81)* ---
Ct-1 --- -0.82 (-4.80)* --- -0.28 (-2.77)* --- 0.01(1.00)
2 R 0.54 0.50 0.17 0.50 0.53 0.54
DW 1.79 2.06 --- 1.83 1.85 2.18
SER 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.97 0.04
































Table 3. (Continued) Trivariate Estimates of Restricted ECMs: The  Case of Inflation
                                 Greece                                           United Kingdom                                Ireland
DYt DGt DYt DGt DYt DGt
JB 0.15 1.68 2.94 0.30 0.38 0.12
RESET(1) 0.25 1.07 1.63 0.24 0.01 0.04
ARCH(2) 1.29 0.41 3.12 0.96 1.55 0.25
ARCH(3) 1.92 0.35 2.36 1.51 0.97 0.16
BG(2) 0.63 0.16 0.56 0.71 0.54 1.04
BG(3) 0.83 0.22 0.60 0.84 0.35 0.86
Notes: * is significant at the 5% level. Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. The error-correction term Et-1 (lagged one period) is the residual series
from the regression of Yt on Gt and Dln Pt, while Ct-1 (lagged one period) is the residual from the corresponding regression of Gt on Yt and Dln Pt.
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in the long run, running from DY to DG in the case of Greece and from DY to
DG in the case of Ireland.
Third, in Greece, when inflation is introduced into the system, the positive
short-run influence of expansive demand policies, whose most immediate
impact on real per capita income might be expansionary (see Table 1), after
inflation sets in the consequences are negative.13 This important result does
not necessarily contradict our conclusion that there is evidence supporting
the Keynesian view about the causal effect of government spending on real
output. However, at the very least, it qualifies the results of this policy if it is
not a genuinely counter cyclical policy, but rather it is ultimately based on
inflationary finance that leads to an inflation bias.14 On the other hand, in the
UK an increase in government spending initially causes real per capita income
to rise, as firms increase their production to meet demand; but when output
rises above the full employment level, there is upward pressure on the price
level, which gives rise to inflation. This is a Keynesian prediction that inflation
is procyclical and lagging. By contrast, in Ireland, public sector size growth
continued to have a procyclical effect on economic growth, despite the counter
cyclical effects of inflation. Nevertheless, the sign of the inflation coefficient,
in the government size equation, is the opposite of that indicated by
stabilization policy. That is, expenditures should be cut, not increased, when
inflation is high. Why the procyclical effects of inflation on government
spending should have been so severe, during the period examined, is hard to
say. A variety of explanations present themselves, including differential cost
increases in the public sector and overzealous application of inflation
supplementation. These findings are, again, in line with the Keynesian notion,
which indicates a powerful effect of government spending on real per capita
income growth.
13 This negative (and statistically significant) relationship between growth and inflation,
does not mean that inflation is “detrimental to growth” –it simply means that over the
period examined inflation has been on average countercyclical, i.e. that aggregate supply
shocks (e.g. increases in oil prices) have dominated aggregate demand shocks (e.g. fiscal
policies).
14 Our sincere thanks to a referee of this Journal for pointing out this finding to us.150 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
VI. Conclusions
Utilising annual data drawn from the UK, Greece and Ireland, this paper
has examined the relationship between government size growth and income
growth in both bivariate and trivariate systems, based on cointegration analysis,
ECM strategy and Granger causality tests. On the basis of our empirical results,
the following broad conclusions emerge. First, in all countries public
expenditure Granger causes growth in national income either in the short or
the long run. This is born out by the bivariate as well as the trivariate analysis.
The analysis generally rejects the hypothesis that public expansion has
hampered economic growth in these countries. The underlying growth rates
impact of the public sector has been positive, which means that public spending
fosters overall economic development. Second, Greece is supportive of the
Wagner hypothesis that increased output causes growth in public expenditure.
This is apparent in a bivariate test as well as in trivariate system. Third, while
causality from national income to public spending is the distinctive feature of
the Greek case, British data also indicated a similar pattern when a trivariate
model (with inflation as an additional variable) is adopted. By contrast, the
results for Ireland do not indicate any Wagnerian-type causality effect. Finally,
we believe that while other potential variables, like real interest rate or public
debt over GNP, remain unexplored, the present study indicates the likely
dimensionality of a macro model that would explain the behavioural
relationship between real per capita income and the size of the public sector.
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